The buck stops here—or does it? Illinois’ Pre-Judgment Interest Statute continues to pack a punch in personal injury and wrongful death cases

Illinois’ pinnacle case on pre-judgment interest statute 735 ILCS 5/2-1303(c) (Section 1303(c)), Cotton v. Coccaro[1], laid pivotal groundwork for parties to seek additional recovery in personal injury and wrongful death claims. The Cotton court affirmed the imposition of pre-judgment interest on plaintiffs $6,528,000.00 medical malpractice verdict and upheld the constitutionality of Section 1303(c) on three bases. First, the court found that Section 1303(c) promotes the jury’s function to accurately calculate damages. Second, it provides compensation for a plaintiff’s delay in being made whole via the passage of time. Third, it promotes a fairer and more even disbursement of damages to successful tort plaintiffs. Illinois courts have recently clarified these concepts in several key respects.

Some advocates have tried to expand Section 1303(c)’s reach in the wake of Cotton. However, Concrete Structures/Sachi, J.V. v. Clark/Bulley/OVC/Power[2] confirms that the concept of interest is fact-specific. Illinois has several separate pre-judgment interest statutes, each of which addresses defined and distinct circumstances. The Concrete court relied on Cotton and its interpretation of Section 1303(c) to ultimately deny plaintiff’s request for pre-judgment interest via the Illinois Public Construction Bond Act[3] and/or Illinois Interest Act[4]. While Concrete echoes the policy concerns raised in Cotton, it refused to expand the reach of Section 1303(c) to breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims which were not contemplated by this statute. Concrete’s refusal to blur the lines between Section 1303(c) and the other Illinois statutes that address interest confirm the importance of its specific and narrow interpretation.

Recent case law also reminds litigants that Section 1303(c) grants Illinois courts discretion to modify both trial verdicts and alternative dispute resolution awards. This is highlighted by the recent Illinois Supreme Court case of Jordan v. Macedo[5], which holds that: (i) one’s failure to seek pre-judgment interest at arbitration does not constitute a waiver of that right; and (ii) application of pre-judgment interest to an arbitration award does not conflict with Supreme Court Rules preventing substantive modifications of arbitration awards. The Jordan decision is based on the fact that Section 1303(c) is procedural in nature as pre-judgment interest is incurred exclusively by the passage of time. Thus, the statute functions as a statutory additur (applicable upon the satisfaction of certain conditions) versus a component of tort damages.

Kroft v. Viper Trans, Inc.[6] takes the reasoning employed through Jordan a step further, holding that application of pre-judgment interest via Section 1303(c) is mandatory where a party intentionally causes delays in personal injury or wrongful death proceedings. In Kroft, the court upheld an award of prejudgment interest under Section 1303(c), including the time after a new trial was granted because the defendant’s willful misconduct (e.g., showing highly prejudicial evidence to the jury) was the root cause of the new trial order. The Kroft decision is punitive in nature and confirms that the plain language of Section 1303(c) remains applicable to all personal injury and wrongful death cases, gamesmanship asid.

The final and most interesting elaboration of Cotton comes via Johnson v. Advoc. Health & Hosps.[7], whichclarifies what kind of settlement offers count under Section 1303(c). In Johnson, the court rejected the parties’ “high-low” settlement structure as a formal “offer” under Section 1303(c) given its conditional nature. Said differently,  high-low settlement offers may fail under Section 1303(c) if a verdict falls within a high-low settlement range for which no hard “offer” exists. Under this scenario, any formal settlement offer is moot. However, the Johnson court conceded one key scenario in which high-low settlement offers can work, though left entirely up to chance: where a jury verdict falls outside of the agreed-upon settlement range. Such a verdict formally triggers either the “high” or the “low” offer, which becomes binding upon the parties. The Johnson holding confirms that a “high-low” settlement offer is a risky one that may not effectively thwart the application of prejudgment interest.

These post Cotton decisions reinforce the need to keep a close eye on 735 ILCS 5/2-1303(c) as it evolves. Chuhak & Tecson maintains its dedication to advising its clients and the public on this issue and welcomes the opportunity to answer any corresponding questions.

Client alert authored by Loretto M. Kennedy  (312 855 5444), principal and General Counsel and Adrienne M. Arlan  (312 855 4315), associate. This Chuhak & Tecson, P.C. communication is intended only to provide information regarding developments in the law and information of general

[1] Cotton v. Coccaro, 468 Ill.Dec. 563 (Ill. 2023).

[2] Concrete Structures/Sachi, J.V. v. Clark/Bulley/OVC/Power, 2024 IL App (1st) 240082, ¶ 1, 7-8, 13 appeal denied, 251 N.E.3d 412 (Ill. 2025).

[3] 30 ILCS 550/2.

[4] 815 ILCS 205/2.

[5] Jordan v. Macedo, 2024 IL App (1st) 230079, ¶¶ 29-32, 244 N.E.3d 341, 349–50, appeal allowed, 244 N.E.3d 250 (Ill. 2024), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 2025 IL 130687, ¶¶ 29-32.

[6] Kroft v. Viper Trans, Inc., 2025 IL App (1st) 240220, ¶¶ 73-75.

[7] Johnson v. Advoc. Health & Hosps. Corp., 2025 IL App (1st) 230087, ¶¶ 73-89, as modified on denial of reh’g (June 11, 2025), appeal pending (Sep Term 2025).