Street vacation is the legal process by which a city formally transfers, in whole or in part, the public right of way to an adjacent property owner. This is typically done when the public interest is better served by the city relinquishing the real estate to a private user. The process to vacate a street in Chicago is overseen by the Department of Transportation (CDOT) Project Development Division’s Street and Alley Vacation Program. This program has four categories of use – commercial and residential, intergovernmental, not for profit and industrial. Each program category differs in purpose, qualifications and typical use.
Street vacation for commercial and residential use is available to adjacent owners for site expansion, parking, security or other accessory uses that will improve the operation of the participating company or homeowner.
Not for profit street vacation may be granted to not for profit organizations for purposes of expansion and modernization, vehicle and bicycle parking for employees and clients, walkways, security, landscaping and campus improvement and other accessory uses beneficial to the organization or the public. The benefits of the not for profit vacation program are not realized solely by the participating organization, as the public good is also served by the organization’s activities.
City entities may be granted street vacation to serve the changing needs of the public. The intergovernmental entity must be a City of Chicago department or a City agency, such as the CTA.
Street vacation for industrial uses may be utilized for plant expansion, modernization, employee parking, security, truck staging and accessory uses likely to improve the operations of the participating entity. Like the not for profit use category, the benefits of this program are realized by the city through job retention, expanded property tax base, reduced illegal dumping and crime prevention. Uses must be exclusively industrial; projects that include any commercial or residential element must be processed under the commercial and residential program.
Separately, the Department of Public Health and Safety issues PlayStreet grants, which allow residents in prioritized community areas to establish short-term street closures and traffic restrictions for safe play.
After a vacation application is submitted, either electronically or by mail, CDOT coordinates internal review to ensure satisfaction with program guidelines, followed by an agency review to facilitate negotiations with any involved member entities. Approved proposals proceed to City Council for legislative action and once passed, the transfer is recorded with the Cook County Clerk. The typical timeline from CDOT’s receipt of a complete application package to final processing is approximately ten months.
Chuhak & Tecson real estate attorneys have wide-ranging experience and knowledge. Please contact us should you have questions about any real estate matter. We stand ready to assist you in all your real estate issues.
Client alert authored by Kevin M. Coyne (312 855 5441) Principal, with research and drafting assistance by Katie Bendalin (312 855 4335), Law Clerk.
This Chuhak & Tecson, P.C. communication is intended only to provide information regarding developments in the law and information of general interest. It is not intended to constitute advice regarding legal problems and should not be relied upon as such.
Chuhak & Tecson, P.C. congratulates Mallory A. Moreno, principal and leader of the firm’s Elder Law practice, who has been named an “Influential Woman in Law” honoree for Law Bulletin Media’s 6th Annual Women in Law: Leaders Leaning In for 2025. The 2025 honorees were selected for their work to advance other women in the profession, being a shining example of leadership, and their significant individual successes. This honor is a peer-nominated award.
Mallory is a Certified Elder Law Attorney (CELA), an exclusive honor bestowed on a select group of attorneys and one of only 13 CELAs in Illinois. Mallory serves as a voice for the voiceless, a steady hand in times of anxiety and uncertainty and an empathetic counselor and advocate who skillfully protects the interests and well-being of seniors, individuals with disabilities, and the families who love them.
Mallory is also a member of the Board of Directors and past president of the Illinois Chapter of the National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys (IL NAELA). She has earned an impressive number of recognitions and awards from her peers for her professional excellence and accomplishments. She is a recurring faculty speaker for the Illinois Institute for Continuing Legal Education (IICLE) as well as other organizations and has co-authored a chapter titled “Termination or Modification of Guardianship” in Adult Guardianships, Advance Directives, and Mental Health Law 2025 Edition (IICLE® 2025), one of IICLE’s many comprehensive practice handbooks for Illinois attorneys.
Service plays a vital role in Mallory’s life. She volunteers for the Special Olympics and is both a volunteer and board member of W.A.L.L.S., Inc. (Working Adults Learning Lifelong Skills), a life skills center for adults with disabilities. At Chuhak & Tecson, Mallory currently serves as an ombudsperson for the firm and is also an ambassador for Chuhak & Tecson’s Women Helping Women program. Mentoring is also a pillar of Mallory’s career, and she currently serves on the Pre-Law Alumni Advisory Board for her alma mater, Miami University, in Oxford, Ohio.
Chuhak & Tecson congratulates Mallory on this wonderful acknowledgement.
Over the past fifteen years, artificial intelligence (AI) has become increasingly embedded in the legal field, often in ways that were not widely anticipated. While it was initially expected that legal professionals would need to familiarize themselves with AI tools to enhance efficiency in practice, few foresaw the necessity for attorneys to possess a deep understanding of AI’s technical functions in order to competently advise clients on the legal ramifications of its use. Although the application of traditional AI to accomplish tasks such as resolve analytical problems or sort large datasets has become routine, the evolution of the technology now enables generative AI to not merely process information, but to autonomously make decisions based on the information presented. Generative AI is capable of generating new content such as images or text by learning from data supplied to it.[i] The most popular examples of generative AI that have been integrated into professionals everyday use are Google’s Gemini and Microsoft’s Copilot. Every time a user drafts an email or a word document or simply completes a search on Google, generative AI is taking that information to provide suggestions and generating responses. Other examples of generative AI include Chat GPT, Meta AI, Claude and many more that are constantly under development.
In recognition of these risks, the Illinois Supreme Court has explicitly cautioned against the uncritical adoption of generative AI in legal proceedings and emphasized the necessity of protecting due process, equal protection and access to justice.[ii] The Illinois Supreme Court warned that AI-generated content, lacking evidentiary foundation or accuracy, may entrench bias, prejudice litigants and obscure truth-finding and decision-making.[iii] While the Illinois Supreme Court’s warning of the unintended consequences of AI was limited to those in the legal profession, the warning is one that should be considered by all users of generative AI.
In particular, there has been an increase of the use of AI in the employment sector, which has resulted in enhanced and efficient decision-making for many employers, particularly in the areas of recruitment and staff management. Employers are using AI to analyze candidate qualifications and employee performance. These practices are frequently justified on the basis that algorithmic decision-making can reduce human bias and produce objective outcomes. At first glance, this practice seems appropriate and can result in quick and efficient decisions, improving the flow of businesses.
Closer scrutiny of this practice by legislatures and legal professionals, however, revealed complex legal and ethical concerns. Critics of generative AI have recognized that the manner in which information is deciphered and sorted may border on improper or cross the line into illegal, replicating or amplifying existing biases. These same critics began to wonder what guidelines and information AI was using to make its decisions. How was the technology making its critical decisions? Was it possible the technology is biased and producing biased results?
At the legislative level, Illinois has recognized the possibility of the misuse of generative AI and the potential consequences and has responded in kind by regulating its use. In the employment context, key statutes that regulate the use of AI include the Artificial Intelligence Video Interview Act (AVIA) and the Illinois Human Rights Act (IHRA). These legislative enactments focus on transparency of use and prohibiting discrimination through AI. Although the Illinois General Assembly has introduced several bills aimed at establishing broad regulatory oversight of AI, none have yet to be enacted into law. These proposed bills included:
- Illinois Senate Bill 1792, which would amend the Consumer Fraud and Business Practices Act and require owners, licensees or operators of a generative AI system to display a warning on the system user’s interface to notify the user that outputs of the generative AI system may be inaccurate.
- Illinois Senate Bill 2255, which would prohibit the use of surveillance data in an automated decision-making system to set an individuals wage for an employee.
- Illinois House Bill 3567, which would prohibit an Illinois agency or any entity acting on behalf of a state agency from utilizing any automated decision-making system without continuous meaningful human review when performing any of the agency’s specified functions.
Nonetheless, the trajectory suggests that more comprehensive legislation is forthcoming as AI technologies continue to evolve.
Overview of current regulation of AI in Illinois
Artificial Intelligence Video Interview Act (AVIA)
In place since 2020, but unknown to many employers, the AVIA regulates employers’ use of AI to analyze an applicant’s video recordings for employment positions based in Illinois.[iv] Review of pre-recorded videos, where a candidate responds to a set of questions, is becoming a popular method for employers to assess a candidates qualifications based on their responses. This pre-assessment often determines if a candidate will move forward in the hiring process and receive a more formal interview.
When first enacted, the AVIA imposed three requirements upon employers to ensure transparency regarding the use of AI.[v] Before requesting an applicant to submit an interview video, employers were required to: i) notify applicants before any interview that AI may be used to analyze the applicant’s video and evaluate fitness for the position; ii) notify the applicant before the interview how the potential employer’s AI functions and the general characteristics which AI evaluated from the video; and iii) secure the applicant’s consent to be evaluated by AI.[vi] Employers may not use AI to evaluate applicants if the applicant refuses to provide consent.[vii] Oddly, the AVIA is silent on whether or not the employer has can obligation to still provide an interview if the candidate refuses to provide consent for the use of AI.
Notably, even when an applicant consents, the employer is restricted in its use of the video.[viii] The AVIA prohibits employers from sharing interview videos except with those persons whose expertise or technology is necessary to evaluate the video for the applicant’s fitness for the position.[ix]
AVIA also contains provisions for destruction of an applicant’s video.[x] Within thirty days of an applicant’s request, the employer must delete an applicant’s video including all electronically stored back-up copies.[xi] In addition, the employer must also instruct any persons who received copies of the applicant’s video to delete the videos.[xii]
Since its enactment, AVIA was amended to expand transparency and limit potential bias by any employers who opted to use AI video analysis.[xiii] In 2022, the legislature amended AVIA to include mandatory reporting for any employer who relied solely on artificial intelligence to evaluate applicants.[xiv]Employers are required to report every December 31: (i) the race and ethnicity of applicants who are and are not afforded the opportunity for an in-person interview after the use of AI analysis; and (ii) the race and ethnicity of applicants who are hired.[xv]
Illinois Human Rights Act (IHRA)
On January 1, 2025, the Illinois legislature updated the IHRA to prohibit discriminatory employment decisions using AI.[xvi] To prevent any confusion as to what AI is covered under the amended regulations, the Illinois legislature defined AI and generative AI. Under the IHRA, AI is defined as “a machine-based system that for explicit or implicit objectives, infers from the input it receives, how to generate outputs such as predictions, content, recommendations or decisions that can influence physical or virtual environments.”[xvii] This definition explicitly notes that AI includes generative AI.[xviii] Generative AI is defined as “an automated computing system that when prompted with human prompts, descriptions or queries, can produce outputs that simulate human-produced content, including but not limited to, the following:
- Textual outputs such as short answers, essays, poetry or longer compositions or answers;
- Image outputs such as fine art, photographs conceptual art, diagrams and other images;
- Multimedia outputs, such as audio or video in the form of compositions, songs or short-form or long form audio or video; and
- Other content that would be otherwise produced by humans.”[xix]
Effective January 1, 2026, employers will be liable for civil right violations for an employment decision using AI with respect to recruitment, hiring, promotion, renewal of employment, selection for training or apprenticeship, discharge, discipline, tenure or the terms, privileges or conditions of employment that results in discrimination based on a protected class or that uses zip codes as a proxy for protected classes.[xx] Employers will also be required to provide notice to an employee that an employer is using AI for the prior stated reasons.[xxi] Protected classes under IHRA shall remain race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, age, sex, marital status, order of protection status, disability, military status, sexual orientation, pregnancy, unfavorable discharge from military service, citizenship status, work authorization status, family responsibilities and reproductive health decisions.[xxii]
Potential future regulations in Illinois
As AI continues to be pushed as the key to the future and as companies find new and innovative ways to adopt AI to their business models, state legislatures will need to adapt and respond with regulations to control this expansive industry. Illinois is one of many states that seems to be taking a proactive approach to its regulation of AI, which could have far reaching implications for those who deploy AI and those whose personal information is the subject of AI’s analysis.[xxiii]
On February 7, 2025, the Illinois Senate introduced SB 2203, the Preventing Algorithmic Discrimination Act (PADA).[xxiv] PADA is intended to regulate deployers of AI who use the technology to make consequential decisions. If PADA were to pass, it would regulate private businesses, persons and government agencies who use AI to grant persons access to employment, education, housing, essential utilities, health care, including family planning, financial services, legal services and hearings, voting and access to benefits. Under PADA, users of AI for the purposes enumerated under the Act, would be required to: (i) notify persons who are the subject of any AI decision, (ii) maintain a governance program containing administrative and technical safeguards to measure and manage reasonably foreseeable risks of discrimination and (iii) submit all assessments of the AI tool to the Attorney General. As of publication, SB2203 has made no progress and is unlikely to pass this current legislative session.
Implications for employers
Given the increasing reliance on generative AI in both the private and public sectors, it is imperative that employers consider the manner in which AI is deployed, acquire an in- depth understanding of how it functions and deciphers information and never rely on AI to be the sole decision maker. If employers are already using AI in any employment related decisions, it is necessary for employers to review company practices to ensure oversight of AI systems and review service providers agreements to understand how the system is reaching its decisions. Failure to do so may expose employers to significant legal liability.
AI systems are designed to autonomously process and analyze vast volumes of data. While beneficial, this process also increases the potential for unintended discrimination, which is now explicitly prohibited under the IHRA. If AI tools are the sole decision makers in recruitment, salaries, performance evaluations or disciplinary decisions, there is an increased risk that it may reinforce or exacerbate existing biases. Crucially, many employers may not be fully aware when AI decision-making crosses the line into discriminatory territory. Discrimination can manifest in two ways:
- Disparate Treatment – when individuals are treated differently based on protected characteristics such as race, gender, age or disability.
- Disparate Impact – when a seemingly neutral AI policy or algorithm disproportionately affects a protected group, even if unintentionally.
Both forms of discrimination can expose employers to costly civil litigation, regulatory investigations and class action lawsuits. In conjunction with the cost of litigation, employers may find themselves liable for claimant’s lost benefits, unpaid wages, compensatory damages and attorney’s fees.
In 2014, while developing AI software to examine candidate resumes, Amazon was forced to terminate a project after determining it would result in disparate impact.[xxv] The software was designed to review resumes and determine which applicants should be hired but Amazon discovered it was discriminating against female applicants in technical positions, such as software engineers.[xxvi] When developing the software, Amazon used its own employees’ resumes as a data set for desired qualifications and these employees were predominately male.[xxvii] When the software was asked to discover other resumes from the existing data set, it sought to reproduce the demographics of the existing workforce, discriminating against female candidates.[xxviii] The software accomplished this by downgrading resumes that listed women’s colleges or activities that contained women in the title.[xxix] Luckily for Amazon, this flaw in the software was discovered early enough that it had no real impact. Employers who choose to use similar methods to screen candidates, must be similarly vigilant.
Another source of exposure Illinois employers should remain cognizant of is the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA).[xxx] BIPA requires users of software that capture biometric information to notify the individual their biometric information is being captured, specify the purpose of the collection, the period of time the biometric information will stored and obtain a written release, prior to collecting any biometric information.[xxxi] Employers who use AI facial recognition in conjunction with video interviews, such as to analyze facial expressions, speech patterns and other non-verbal cues to assess personality traits and confidence, could face liability under AVIA and BIPA. Violations of BIPA have led to substantial settlements and penalties in recent years including Facebook’s $650 million settlement,[xxxii] Google’s $100 million settlement,[xxxiii] and TikTok’s $92 million settlement.[xxxiv]
While Illinois’ smaller employers are unlikely to face settlements comparable to the country’s largest organizations, these substantial settlements should serve as a cautionary tale of the implications of unchecked AI. As the technology advances, so too must the diligence with which it is implemented and monitored.
Conclusion
As AI continues to evolve and embed itself in core business functions, the need for comprehensive oversight and responsible use becomes increasingly urgent. Illinois has taken a proactive stance in recognizing both the potential benefits and significant risks associated with generative AI, particularly in the employment sector. Through legislation like the Artificial Intelligence in Video Act and amendments to the Illinois Human Rights Act, the state has prioritized transparency, accountability and the prevention of discrimination. Looking ahead, proposed legislation such as the Preventing Algorithmic Discrimination Act signals a broader regulatory framework that could reshape how AI is governed across industries. Businesses that adopt AI must move beyond convenience and efficiency to fully understand AI’s capabilities and its limitations. Failure to do so could expose companies to substantial legal liability. In this rapidly changing landscape, staying informed and compliant is not just advisable … it is essential.
Client alert authored by Markeya A. Fowler, (312 849 4126), associate.
This Chuhak & Tecson, P.C. communication is intended only to provide information regarding developments in the law and information of general interest. It is not intended to constitute advice regarding legal problems and should not be relied upon as such.
[i] Merriam Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/generative%20AI
[ii] Illinois Supreme Court Policy on Artificial Intelligence, effective January 1, 2025, https://ilcourtsaudio.blob.core.windows.net/antilles-resources/resources/e43964ab-8874-4b7a-be4e-63af019cb6f7/Illinois%20Supreme%20Court%20AI%20Policy.pdf
[iii] Id.
[iv] 820 ILCS 42-5
[v] Id.
[vi] Id.
[vii] Id.
[viii] Id. at 42-10
[ix] Id.
[x] Id. at 42-15
[xi] Id.
[xii] Id.
[xiii] Id at 42-20
[xiv] Id.
[xv] Id.
[xvi] 775 ILCS 5/2-102
[xvii] Id at 101(M)
[xviii] Id.
[xix] Id. at 101(N)
[xx] Id. at 101 (L)(1)
[xxi] Id. at 101 (L)(1)
[xxii] Id. at 101 (E-1)
[xxiii] Texas enacted the Texas Responsible Artificial Intelligence Act, Colorado enacted the Colorado Artificial Intelligence Act and California, Georgia, Hawaii and Washington have bills pending.
[xxiv] https://www.ilga.gov/documents/legislation/104/SB/PDF/10400SB2203lv.pdf
[xxv] Why Amazon’s Automated Hiring Tool Discriminated Against Women, Rachel Goodman, October 12, 2018, https://www.aclu.org/news/womens-rights/why-amazons-automated-hiring-tool-discriminated-against#:~:text=But%2C%20according%20to%20a%20Reuters%20report%20this,technical%20jobs%2C%20such%20as%20software%20engineer%20positions.
[xxvi] Id.
[xxvii] Id.
[xxviii] Id.
[xxix] Id.
[xxx] 740 ILCS 14/15
[xxxi] Id. at 14/15 (b)
[xxxii] In re Facebook Biometric Info. Privacy Litigation, No. 3:15-cv-03747-JD (N.D. Cal. 2020).
[xxxiii] Rivera, et al. v. Google, 1:2016-cv-02714 (N.D. Ill 2018)
[xxxiv] In re TikTok, Inc., Consumer Privacy Litigation, No. 1:2020-cv-04699 (N.D. Ill 2024)
On January 1, 2026, the Illinois Receivership Act (the Act) takes effect. The Act builds upon a patchwork of laws in Illinois to create a broad framework for creditors and other parties in interest for the appointment of a receiver over most types of real property, personal property and businesses. Here are six important things to know about the Act.
1. A receiver may be appointed as a primary remedy, pre-judgment and post-judgment, in cases involving: (a) lien enforcement where property is at risk of waste or impairment; (b) fraud; (c) a company with deadlocked management; and (d) a company that is insolvent or not paying its debts.
Notably, the Act does not modify a mortgagee’s rights under the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Act to seek the appointment of a receiver. Rather, the new Act expands the circumstances under which a receiver can be appointed and formalizes the processes and broadens the powers associated therewith.
2. The court may appoint a receiver without notice if circumstances warrant.
3. Once a receiver is appointed, the court has exclusive jurisdiction: (a) over all receivership property wherever it is located; and (b) over all controversies related to or arising from the receivership and its property.
4. The receiver has broad powers over receivership property, including to: (a) collect, manage and protect it; (b) operate a business by, among other things, incurring debt and paying expenses; (c) assert a claim or defense for the owner; (d) compel a party to produce records and/or be examined under oath; (e) engage professionals such as attorneys and accountants; and (f) transfer it by sale, lease or other disposition.
5. Upon notice from the receiver, creditors are required to timely file a claim against the receivership and if they fail to do so, the claim may be waived.
6. The court may order a receiver’s fees and expenses to be paid from: (a) the receivership property; (b) the person requesting appointment; or (c) a person whose conduct justified the appointment such as the owner.
In sum, Illinois receivers will soon have powers that could benefit secured and unsecured creditors in a variety of tricky situations.
If you have a matter that may warrant the appointment of a receiver, contact Michael W. Debre or another member of Chuhak & Tecson’s Financial Services team.
Client alert authored by Michael W. Debre (312 855 4603), principal.
This Chuhak & Tecson, P.C. communication is intended only to provide information regarding developments in the law and information of general interest. It is not intended to constitute advice regarding legal problems and should not be relied upon as such.
Financial institutions and creditors could face significantly reduced recovery prospects under Public Act 104-120, which takes effect on January 1, 2026. This legislation substantially expands homestead protections for Illinois debtors by amending 735 ILCS 5/12-901 to more than triple the homestead exemption from $15,000 to $50,000 for individual property owners. For co-owned properties, the total exemption increases from $30,000 to $100,000, with each owner’s share proportionate to their ownership percentage.
This amendment creates significant new obstacles for creditors seeking to collect from debtors. Because a home is often a debtor’s most valuable asset, creditors have historically looked to home equity to collect on debts. The homestead exemption prevents creditors from recovering on a homeowner’s equity when the debtor’s equity interest remains below the exemption threshold. Under the previous law, creditors could pursue collection on properties with equity above $15,000. Now, they cannot do so unless the debtor’s equity exceeds $50,000.
The increased exemption applies broadly to single-family homes, condominiums, cooperatives and certain personal property used as a residence. The math is straightforward: a property held in joint tenancy valued at $350,000 with a $250,000 mortgage balance has $100,000 in equity. Under the old law, creditors could force a sale by recording a memorandum of judgment and initiating foreclosure proceedings because the equity exceeded $30,000. The creditor could recover up to $70,000 out of the property. Now, that same equity cannot be used to satisfy a judgment lien because $100,000 is the new threshold. The increased exemption also limits creditor recovery prospects in bankruptcy proceedings, where the expanded protected equity makes distribution from the debtor’s homestead interest far less likely.
Properties that once represented viable collection opportunities may no longer yield any recovery, requiring creditors to reassess their risk models and collection strategies. Financial institutions should begin evaluating their exposure now, implementing updated underwriting criteria and collection procedures to account for this substantially higher exemption threshold.
The lawyers in Chuhak & Tecson’s Financial Services practice group can help you navigate this significant change from updating your collection procedures to developing strategies that protect your interests under the new exemption framework. Contact us to discuss how these changes affect your specific lending and collection practices.
Client alert authored by Nicholas LaCourt (312 855 4344), associate.
This Chuhak & Tecson, P.C. communication is intended only to provide information regarding developments in the law and information of general interest. It is not intended to constitute advice regarding legal problems and should not be relied upon as such.problems and should not be relied upon as such
Illinois’ pinnacle case on pre-judgment interest statute 735 ILCS 5/2-1303(c) (Section 1303(c)), Cotton v. Coccaro[1], laid pivotal groundwork for parties to seek additional recovery in personal injury and wrongful death claims. The Cotton court affirmed the imposition of pre-judgment interest on plaintiffs $6,528,000.00 medical malpractice verdict and upheld the constitutionality of Section 1303(c) on three bases. First, the court found that Section 1303(c) promotes the jury’s function to accurately calculate damages. Second, it provides compensation for a plaintiff’s delay in being made whole via the passage of time. Third, it promotes a fairer and more even disbursement of damages to successful tort plaintiffs. Illinois courts have recently clarified these concepts in several key respects.
Some advocates have tried to expand Section 1303(c)’s reach in the wake of Cotton. However, Concrete Structures/Sachi, J.V. v. Clark/Bulley/OVC/Power[2] confirms that the concept of interest is fact-specific. Illinois has several separate pre-judgment interest statutes, each of which addresses defined and distinct circumstances. The Concrete court relied on Cotton and its interpretation of Section 1303(c) to ultimately deny plaintiff’s request for pre-judgment interest via the Illinois Public Construction Bond Act[3] and/or Illinois Interest Act[4]. While Concrete echoes the policy concerns raised in Cotton, it refused to expand the reach of Section 1303(c) to breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims which were not contemplated by this statute. Concrete’s refusal to blur the lines between Section 1303(c) and the other Illinois statutes that address interest confirm the importance of its specific and narrow interpretation.
Recent case law also reminds litigants that Section 1303(c) grants Illinois courts discretion to modify both trial verdicts and alternative dispute resolution awards. This is highlighted by the recent Illinois Supreme Court case of Jordan v. Macedo[5], which holds that: (i) one’s failure to seek pre-judgment interest at arbitration does not constitute a waiver of that right; and (ii) application of pre-judgment interest to an arbitration award does not conflict with Supreme Court Rules preventing substantive modifications of arbitration awards. The Jordan decision is based on the fact that Section 1303(c) is procedural in nature as pre-judgment interest is incurred exclusively by the passage of time. Thus, the statute functions as a statutory additur (applicable upon the satisfaction of certain conditions) versus a component of tort damages.
Kroft v. Viper Trans, Inc.[6] takes the reasoning employed through Jordan a step further, holding that application of pre-judgment interest via Section 1303(c) is mandatory where a party intentionally causes delays in personal injury or wrongful death proceedings. In Kroft, the court upheld an award of prejudgment interest under Section 1303(c), including the time after a new trial was granted because the defendant’s willful misconduct (e.g., showing highly prejudicial evidence to the jury) was the root cause of the new trial order. The Kroft decision is punitive in nature and confirms that the plain language of Section 1303(c) remains applicable to all personal injury and wrongful death cases, gamesmanship asid.
The final and most interesting elaboration of Cotton comes via Johnson v. Advoc. Health & Hosps.[7], whichclarifies what kind of settlement offers count under Section 1303(c). In Johnson, the court rejected the parties’ “high-low” settlement structure as a formal “offer” under Section 1303(c) given its conditional nature. Said differently, high-low settlement offers may fail under Section 1303(c) if a verdict falls within a high-low settlement range for which no hard “offer” exists. Under this scenario, any formal settlement offer is moot. However, the Johnson court conceded one key scenario in which high-low settlement offers can work, though left entirely up to chance: where a jury verdict falls outside of the agreed-upon settlement range. Such a verdict formally triggers either the “high” or the “low” offer, which becomes binding upon the parties. The Johnson holding confirms that a “high-low” settlement offer is a risky one that may not effectively thwart the application of prejudgment interest.
These post Cotton decisions reinforce the need to keep a close eye on 735 ILCS 5/2-1303(c) as it evolves. Chuhak & Tecson maintains its dedication to advising its clients and the public on this issue and welcomes the opportunity to answer any corresponding questions.
Client alert authored by Loretto M. Kennedy (312 855 5444), principal and General Counsel and Adrienne M. Arlan (312 855 4315), associate. This Chuhak & Tecson, P.C. communication is intended only to provide information regarding developments in the law and information of general
[1] Cotton v. Coccaro, 468 Ill.Dec. 563 (Ill. 2023).
[2] Concrete Structures/Sachi, J.V. v. Clark/Bulley/OVC/Power, 2024 IL App (1st) 240082, ¶ 1, 7-8, 13 appeal denied, 251 N.E.3d 412 (Ill. 2025).
[3] 30 ILCS 550/2.
[4] 815 ILCS 205/2.
[5] Jordan v. Macedo, 2024 IL App (1st) 230079, ¶¶ 29-32, 244 N.E.3d 341, 349–50, appeal allowed, 244 N.E.3d 250 (Ill. 2024), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 2025 IL 130687, ¶¶ 29-32.
[6] Kroft v. Viper Trans, Inc., 2025 IL App (1st) 240220, ¶¶ 73-75.
[7] Johnson v. Advoc. Health & Hosps. Corp., 2025 IL App (1st) 230087, ¶¶ 73-89, as modified on denial of reh’g (June 11, 2025), appeal pending (Sep Term 2025).
The Illinois Workplace Transparency Act (WTA) was not exempt from the many laws the Illinois Legislature amended this August 2025. With changes set to take effect on January 1, 2026, employers must heed the new requirements of the WTA which will impact future employment, settlement and severance agreements. Here are five notable changes to the WTA employers should recognize :
- The WTA protects employees’ ability to make truthful disclosures about unlawful employment practices. The definition of “unlawful employment practices” was expanded to include disclosures of unlawful practices enforced under the Illinois Department of Labor, Illinois Labor Relations Board, U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration or the National Labor Relations Board.
- The WTA explicitly prohibits any contract or agreement that is a condition of employment or continued employment from restricting an employee’s engagement in concerted activity to address work related issues. Any unilateral agreement which prevents concerted activity is automatically void.
- The WTA prohibits any contract or agreement that is a condition of employment or continued employment from diminishing an employee’s right to make any claim by shortening the applicable statute of limitations, applying non-Illinois law to an employee’s claim or requiring a venue outside of Illinois to adjudicate an Illinois employee’s claim. Any unilateral agreement that contains these requirements is void.
- All settlement or termination agreements which contain a confidentiality clause must contain consideration separate of any consideration offered in exchange for a general release.
- In addition to costs and attorneys’ fees for violation of the WTA, employers now also have exposure for consequential damages.
Prior to the new year, employers should review any standard agreements or contracts to ensure they are in compliance with the new requirements under the Workplace Transparency Act.
Client alert authored by Markeya A. Fowler, (312 849 4126), associate.
This Chuhak & Tecson, P.C. communication is intended only to provide information regarding developments in the law and information of general interest. It is not intended to constitute advice regarding legal problems and should not be relied upon as such
In August, the Illinois Legislature passed the Family Neonatal Intensive Care Leave Act (Neonatal Care Act), which expands guaranteed and protected unpaid leave available to employees. The Neonatal Care Act grants Illinois employees unpaid leave to care for a child who is a patient in a neonatal intensive care unit (NICU).
The Neonatal Care Act applies to employers with 16 or more employees. The amount of leave that employers must grant to an employee is dependent on the size of the employer. All employers with 16 to 50 employees must provide employees with 10 days of unpaid leave and employers with 51 or more employees must provide up to 20 days of unpaid leave. Employers are not required to provide unpaid leave to independent contractors under the Neonatal Care Act.
Employees who elect to take leave under the Neonatal Care Act can do so continuously or intermittently. Employers are allowed to set minimum leave requirements prohibiting employees from taking leave in less than two-hour increments. While employers may require documentation or reasonable verification of an employee’s length of stay within a NICU, they are prohibited from requesting any documentation that is protected under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) or any other law.
Employers should take note that unlike many other paid and unpaid leave laws in Illinois, leave under the Neonatal Care Act may be taken in addition to, and upon completion of, leave available under the Family Medical and Leave Act (FMLA). Employers are also prohibited from requiring an employee to use available paid leave instead of taking the leave available under the Neonatal Care Act. However, an employee may choose to use any entitlement for paid or unpaid leave as a substitution for the equivalent amount of leave provided.
Leave under the Neonatal Care Act is protected. Thus, at the conclusion of leave, an employer must reinstate the employee to her/his prior position or an equivalent position without any loss of benefits. Employers are required to maintain the employee’s health insurance similar to the requirements under the FMLA.
Employers are also explicitly prohibited from retaliating against the employee for: (i) exercising the rights guaranteed under the Neonatal Care Act; (ii) opposing practices the employee believes to be in violation of the Neonatal Care Act and; (iii) supporting the right of another to exercise their rights under the Neonatal Care Act. Any employers found in violation of the Neonatal Care Act may be liable for unpaid wages, damages and penalties.
The Neonatal Care Act is effective June 1, 2026, and employers have some time before the new unpaid leave requirement must be provided to eligible employees. However, there were many other changes to employment law this year, including changes to the Victims’ Economic Security and Safety Act, the Nursing Mothers in Workplace Act, and the Military Leave Act. Illinois employers should review and confirm these new legislative amendments and update their policies and procedures as necessary.
Client alert authored by Markeya A. Fowler, (312 849 4126), associate.
This Chuhak & Tecson, P.C. communication is intended only to provide information regarding developments in the law and information of general interest. It is not intended to constitute advice regarding legal problems and should not be relied upon as such.
Estate planning is often associated with death. However, much of what we do as estate planning attorneys also endeavors to assist our clients in planning during life. Two of the most important estate planning documents that are in fact only effective during a person’s life are a Power of Attorney for Property and a Power of Attorney for Healthcare. Both documents actually cease to hold any power upon a person’s death.
Powers of Attorney are a powerful tool to ensure that if you, for any reason, due to disability or illness whether for a short- or long-term period, are unable to make your own financial or health decisions, someone you trust and have nominated is able to act in your stead as your agent. Without Powers of Attorney in place, a guardianship proceeding may need to be initiated with the Court to allow someone to make financial and health decisions on your behalf if it is determined that you are unable to make these decisions independently. Guardianships are costly, lengthy and are public record and thus largely unfavored by clients and their families.
As an estate planning attorney that specializes in elder law, I often see clients who may have Powers of Attorney, but the Power of Attorney does not have the requisite and specific authorities to allow us to do any proper or protective planning for long-term care and Medicaid benefits. As such, there are times we have to initiate a guardianship proceeding even when Powers of Attorneys exist to obtain the necessary authorities for asset preservation and protection in Medicaid and long-term care planning.
Statutory v. Non-Statutory Powers of Attorney
First, we should distinguish Statutory v. Non-Statutory Powers of Attorney. Statutory Powers of Attorney are defined by the Illinois Power of Attorney Act (755 ILCS 45). As such, they contain statutory provisions and language as well as a set format provided for in the statute. Third parties, such as hospitals and financial institutions, must accept properly executed Statutory Powers of Attorney as valid.
Whereas Non-Statutory Powers of Attorney are drafted in any format and provide for a principal’s intent and nominated agent. It can include limited or non-standard powers. The downside is that third parties are not required to accept Non-Statutory Powers of Attorney because there is no automatic statute protection associated with them.
So often clients ask me, “Can’t I just print the Statutory Power of Attorney form online and sign it?” Unfortunately, while this may work in a pinch, more often than not, I see Statutory Powers of Attorney that are not properly witnessed, notarized or executed and thus not valid. Most importantly for clients, they do not include the necessary additional authorities to allow for long-term care and Medicaid planning.
Additional Statutory Power of Attorney for Property authorities
Oftentimes a person requiring long-term care in a nursing home will require Medicaid benefits to pay for that care. Nursing homes costs can average anywhere from $10,000 to $20,000 monthly in private pay. As such, many cannot sustain private pay for a long period of time and Medicaid benefits will be necessary to pay for nursing home care.
Statutory Powers of Attorney contain automatic authorities that an agent can handle on behalf of a principal, however, there are many authorities that are necessary and helpful for planning for and protecting assets for Medicaid benefits that are not automatically included in a Statutory Power of Attorney. The Statutory Power of Attorney allows for the insertion of additional authorities, but most people, without attorney guidance, default to leaving that section blank and miss the opportunity to enable their agents with advantageous authorities.
Some additional authorities that are helpful for Medicaid and long-term care planning include gifting, trust creation, establishing annuities, transfers to spouses in addition to a host of others that encompass and empower an agent with the necessary authorities to protect and preserve your assets to the greatest extent possible to qualify for Medicaid. Without these additional authorities, there is often little to nothing that an agent can legally do within the scope of the Statutory Power of Attorney in situations where a person requires Medicaid for long-term care but has some assets to protect and/or preserve.
Conclusion
Estate planning is for life and not just death. Further, there is no “one size fits all” for estate planning documents, including Powers of Attorney. It is important to meet with a qualified elder law attorney to discuss your Powers of Attorney and estate planning documents to ensure that they are tailored to your needs, including inclusion of ancillary authorities to empower your Power of Attorney agent to act for you.
Client alert authored by Christine A. Barone (312 855 4348), principal.
This Chuhak & Tecson, P.C. communication is intended only to provide information regarding developments in the law and information of general interest. It is not intended to constitute advice regarding legal problems and should not be relied upon as such.
In acknowledging Estate Planning Awareness Week, October 20 – 25, 2025, Agnes Ptasznik, estate planning attorney at Chuhak & Tecson, P.C., explains something that does not always get enough attention. Why it is so important for single people to have an estate plan.
Even if you are not married, you probably have people you care deeply about, maybe a partner, close friends or family members. An estate plan ensures that you decide who will inherit your assets. Without one, state intestacy laws take over and those default rules may not reflect your wishes.
For example, if you are in a committed relationship, but not legally married, your partner would not automatically receive anything under the law and will not receive anything at all unless you have specifically named them as a beneficiary on an account or policy or provided for them in your estate plan.
And if you do not have a partner, estate planning is just as important. It allows you to decide who should receive your property, such as siblings, nieces or nephews, friends or charities that matter to you, instead of leaving those decisions to state law.
Estate planning is not just about “who gets what.” It is about protecting yourself, your loved ones and the causes that reflect your values — ensuring that your wishes, not the state’s rules, guide what happens next.
If you have not started yet, reach out to an experienced estate planning attorney here at Chuhak & Tecson, someone who can help you put the right plan in place for your situation. It is one of the most thoughtful gifts you can give yourself — and the people you care about.
Client alert authored by Agnes A. Ptasznik (312 849 4139), associate.
This Chuhak & Tecson, P.C. communication is intended only to provide information regarding developments in the law and information of general interest. It is not intended to constitute advice regarding legal problems and should not be relied upon as such.